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The Responsibility to Protect is administered through the United Nations Security Council, which 
is often criticised for being ineffective, too selective and for using its power to veto to the detriment 
of States in mass atrocity. Third World States within the international arena are often at the mercy 
of the Security Council and are excluded from decision making processes which may impact them.
This research proposes that the Responsibility to Protect should be administered by regional or-
ganisations rather than the Security Council, owing to the comparative advantages regional organ-
isations have to offer. For example, regional organisations who have proximity to conflict are likely 
to understand the culture and history of States and possess in-depth local knowledge. Neighbour-
ing States within the region also have more at risk, such as bearing the burden of unwanted armed 
groups in their territory, disproportionate numbers of refugees and the impact conflict can have on 
the economy. Regional organisations are also best suited for addressing the structural and root 
causes of conflict. It will be argued that regional organisations could legally intervene within the 
parameters of their own region through ex post facto application of Article 53 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
A Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) will be applied throughout this research. 
TWAIL operates on a philosophy of suspicion which enables it to adopt a critical stance on In-
ternational Law by pushing boundaries to expose injustice. TWAIL will be particularly useful in 
considering the Responsibility to Protect as it will assist in identifying any colonial origins, rhetoric 
and imperialism that is in both policy and law in this area. Doctrinal legal analysis is the method 
which will be applied as it will centre its focus on a comprehensive overview of the key literature in 
this area. A qualitative method is also used as the research involves analytical interpretation and 
analysis and uses TWAIL’s theoretical framework to provide legal reasoning.
 
It is likely that this research shall conclude that if we do not fix a system that is broken, then the 
international community is failing and will continue to fail in its responsibility to protect. The way to 
fix this is through restricting the Security Council’s ability to exercise imperialism and to identify the 
colonialist structures surrounding the Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, regional organisations 
may offer a solution with their comparative advantages, lack of veto power and through including 
the voices of less developed States in the decision-making processes surrounding intervention.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the human consequences of the 1994 
Rwandan Genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica 
Massacre the international community observed 
that more was required to protect human life in 
situations of mass atrocity.1  This sparked the 
move from the controversial use of Humanitar-
ian Intervention to a Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). However, since its inception R2P has 
been at the centre of international debate owing 
to criticisms over its effectiveness.2  Addition-
ally, decision-making surrounding intervention 
is often managed by the powerful States with 
permanent membership of the United Nations 
Security Council. Therefore, R2P excludes the 
voices of Third World States who are often at 
the mercy of decisions they have not made. The 
Third World as a category is a socioeconomic 
construct by the West3  and its reality is a prod-
uct of colonialism which was allowed and facili-
tated by International Law.4
  
The aim of this research is to increase the effec-
tiveness of R2P in responding to mass atrocity 
and to include the voices of Third World States 
in R2P decision-making processes. This will 
be considered through applying a Third World 
Approach to International Law (TWAIL) to ex-
1. The author would like to thank Dr. Alexandra Bohm for providing useful feedback and support with this 
paper. 
2. Graham Melling, ‘Beyond rhetoric? Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect as a norm of humanitarian 
intervention’ (2018) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 5:1, 78-96. 78.
3. The term “Third World” was first used in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy in an article called “Trois mondes, une 
planète” see: Marcin Wojciech Solarz, ‘‘Third World’: the 60th anniversary of a concept that changed history’ 
(2012) 33(9) Third World Quarterly. 1561-1573.
4. Anthony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 4 Soc. & 
Legal Stud. 321.
5. Simon Adams, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (October 2012) 3 Global Centre for the Responsibil-
ity to Protect Occasional Paper Series No. 3 < http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/libyaandr2poccasionalpa-
per-1.pdf > accessed 12 March 2019.
6. Simon Adams, ‘Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council’ (March 2015) Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, Occasional paper Series No. 5 < http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/syriapaper_
final.pdf > accessed 12 March 2019.
7. Translation: with retrospective action or force (out of the aftermath).
8. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119. 
Article 53.
pose the colonial origins of R2P and through 
proposing that regional organisations would 
be a more suitable choice of intervenor based 
on their comparative advantages and ability 
to include the Third World in decision-making. 
The chronology of this paper is as follows: Part 
I will outline the methodology and theoretical 
framework of this research. Part II will provide 
an overview of TWAIL in considering the colonial 
origins of International Law, TWAIL’s objectives 
and its two generations. Part III will address R2P 
creation and its criticisms, notably over its use 
resulting in regime change in Libya5  and its cur-
rent inaction in Syria.6  Part IV will address the 
potential for regional organisations to act as in-
tervenors in mass atrocity with their compara-
tive advantages and the legal basis for this will 
be considered through ex post facto7  applica-
tion of Article 53 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.8  Part V will conclude that if we do not fix 
a system which has been flawed from its incep-
tion, then R2P will always continue to fail in its 
overarching objective of protecting human life in 
mass atrocity. 
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METHODOLOGY
Cryer et al note that “method has empirical and 
sociological connotations”9  and that it means 
“the way in which the project is pursued”.10  Us-
ing this definition, the method of this research 
is doctrinal legal analysis as it will centre its fo-
cus on a comprehensive overview of the key 
literature in this area, including; journal articles, 
books, commentaries, case law, treaties, UN 
resolutions and recommendations. The method 
is also qualitative. As stated by Hutchinson and 
Duncan, qualitative method involves interpreta-
tion and analysis and is the analytical, legal rea-
soning aspect of the process.11
Methodology is “something different from, al-
though related to, ‘method’”12  and it has theo-
retical connotations.13  Methodology means the 
justification for the chosen research method. 
Doctrinal legal analysis is the chosen method 
because it will permit in-depth understanding of 
the current literature to identify gaps. Doctrinal 
legal analysis will also assist in answering the 
overarching research question which is: Can 
TWAIL provide a comprehensive critique of R2P 
and if so, can it provide a viable solution to pro-
tecting human life in mass atrocity? Other meth-
ods available for this subject area, for example 
interviews or participant observation have not 
been selected as they would not add value to 
this specific research. Qualitative method is also 
9. Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, Bal Sokhi-Bulley and Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011). 5. 
10. ibid, 5.
11. Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research” 
(2012)
12. Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, Bal Sokhi-Bulley and Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011). 5.
13. ibid, 5.
14. Michael Fakhri, ‘Introduction- Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda’ (2012) 14 (1) Oregon Review of Internation-
al Law. 1,2.
15. Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).
16. Anthony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 4 Soc. & 
Legal Stud. 321.
17. Translation: International Law
favoured over quantitative method here as it is 
the most logical and accessible within this re-
search and will allow for greater analysis and 
interpretation of the law and will provide legal 
reasoning. The chosen theoretical framework of 
this research is TWAIL for its critical stance will 
be useful in identifying any colonial origins, rhet-
oric and imperialism that may reside in the law 
and policy in this area. An overview of TWAIL will 
be considered in the subsequent subsection.
A THIRD WORLD APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
TWAIL is a multi-disciplinary, academic, social 
and political movement which seeks to expose 
the colonial foundations and imperialism resid-
ing within International Law.14  TWAIL operates 
on a philosophy of suspicion which allows it to 
adopt a critical stance on International Law.15 
TWAIL asserts that International Law is imperi-
al in nature and was created out of the colonial 
encounter.16  The colonial origins of International 
Law will now be explained.
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) became a dis-
tinguished scholar within the field of Interna-
tional Law, notably for the use of jus gentium 17 
during the colonial encounter. Anghie writes ex-
tensively on how the very concept of jus gentium 
used by Vitoria justified colonialism and how this 
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colonial structure is reproduced through Inter-
national Law.18  Jus gentium was used by Vitoria 
to resolve a jurisdictional gap which emerged 
between the Spanish conquistadors and the 
Natives during the conquest of America.19  In-
itially Law was only legitimate if sanctioned by 
the Pope, but Vitoria noted that the Natives were 
not believers in Christianity and could own prop-
erty.20  Therefore, Vitoria identified that the Pope 
was not the appropriate sovereign.21  Next Vito-
ria’s analysis centred on the Spanish Emperor 
as the ruler over the Natives, but Vitoria notes 
this would not resolve jurisdictional issues as the 
Spanish Emperor had not previously ruled over 
the Natives and therefore any Law created by the 
Emperor could not bind those who were not pre-
viously ruled by it.22  To resolve this jurisdictional 
conundrum Vitoria then applies the concept of 
jus gentium, which would bind both the Spanish 
and Natives equally,23  in theory. However, this 
was not equal in practice as the characterisation 
of jus gentium was inherently a Christian and 
Eurocentric creation which would exclude the 
Native voice in application.24  Further, only those 
with Christian values were permitted to wage 
war which ensured that the Natives could only 
ever be the violators of jus gentium and would 
not share rights under jus gentium equally with 
the Spanish.25  This established colonial struc-
ture is still very much alive in International Law 
and its European and Christian origins have led 
to TWAIL scholars critiquing International Law 
18. Anthony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 4 Soc. & 
Legal Stud. 321.
19. ibid, 321.
20. ibid, 323.
21. ibid, 323.
22. ibid, 324.
23. ibid, 326.
24. ibid, 326.
25. ibid, 330.
26. Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31.
27. Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 110.
28. Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31.
29. ibid, 31.
for being an illegitimate regime.26  TWAIL seeks 
to highlight the unfairness of such structures 
and to present new structures in areas of Law 
where colonialism reproduced.27
  
TWAIL’s desire to expose the unfair structures 
of International Law today is demonstrated 
through the three broad objectives of TWAIL 
scholarship as posited by Mutua.28  Namely that 
TWAIL seeks: 
“to understand, deconstruct and unpack 
the uses of International Law as a medium 
for the creation and perpetuation of a radi-
calised hierarchy of International norms and 
institutions (that subordinate non-Europeans 
to Europeans). TWAIL seeks to construct and 
present an alternative normative legal edifice 
for international governance. Finally, TWAIL 
seeks, through scholarship, policy and pol-
itics to eradicate conditions of under-devel-
opment in the Third World”. 29  
This research will centre its focus around these 
objectives through seeking to understand and 
deconstruct how R2P acts as a medium for cre-
ating a hierarchy and intervention norms which 
subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans. Sec-
ondly, it will seek to construct an alternative form 
of R2P governance by limiting the role of the Se-
curity Council and by placing responsibility for 
intervention with regional organisations. Finally, 
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this research aims to assist in eradicating con-
ditions of under-development in the Third World 
through addressing root causes of conflict (pov-
erty, unequal distribution of resources and polit-
ical repression)30  which are caused and facilitat-
ed by colonialism.
Central to TWAIL scholarship is explicit and un-
apologetic use of the term Third World, which 
can be criticised for being anachronistic.31  Yet 
the term must remain for it displays the political 
reality of the marginalised States who are united 
in their common history of colonialism and pres-
ent struggles of underdevelopment.32  To deny 
that the category of Third World States exists is 
to deny the lived experiences of millions of hu-
mans. On this point TWAIL cannot concede, the 
term Third World must be used in its discourse. 
TWAIL scholarship is often split into two gen-
erations;33  TWAIL I and TWAIL II.34  TWAIL I 
was the original TWAIL movement and argues 
that International Law derived from the coloni-
al encounter but that TWAIL can transform In-
30. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001) (ICISS) XI.
31. B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8(1) Int’l Comm. L. 
Rev. 3.
32. ibid.
33. TWAIL is often split into two generations although some literature has argued that a third generation of 
TWAIL exists. See (Madhav Khosla, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase’ (2007) 9 Int’l 
Comm. L. Rev. 291.).
34. Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsi-
bility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) Chinese JIL 77-103.
35. ibid.
36. ibid.
37. ibid.
38. Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsi-
bility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) Chinese JIL 77-103.
39. ibid
40. It is important to state that the author of this paper is a white European and is writing from an institution 
in the Global North, but recognises that her writing cannot speak for, or on behalf of TWAIL, nor is it appro-
priate for this author to set an agenda for TWAIL. The author would align herself as being an ally of TWAIL, 
with the aspiration to further the aims of TWAIL in examining its methodological practices and centring its 
analysis on a more comprehensive approach to understanding International Law, specifically within the con-
text of intervention.
41. ibid.
ternational Law to account for the Third World 
voice.35  TWAIL I also observed that sovereignty 
is essential to TWAIL discourse and that mere 
political independence is not enough.36  TWAIL 
II largely follows the precedent of TWAIL I, but it 
offers an intersectional analysis through assess-
ing problems inherent within the Third World 
itself such as barriers surrounding race, class 
and gender.37  TWAIL II is in alliance with other 
critical theories such as Marxism, Feminism and 
Postcolonialism which allows for insightful anal-
ysis in ways TWAIL I is limited by. Furthermore, 
TWAIL II adopts a critical stance of TWAIL itself, 
and is curious over its own methodological pa-
rameters38  asking questions such as “how do 
we identify what counts as acceptable schol-
arship in International Law”,39  taking note that 
TWAIL is to be recognised as a discipline of the 
Global South and should not be Westernised.40 
TWAIL cannot afford to forfeit itself to other ap-
proaches in International Law41  for its critical 
analysis in practice has the potential alleviate 
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some of the unfair conditions imposed on mar-
ginalised peoples of the Third World. Perhaps 
part of the attraction to TWAIL is its rebellious 
nature which does not fear pushing the bounda-
ries of how we understand and engage with In-
ternational Law and it is for such reasons TWAIL 
may be useful in approaching the topic of R2P.
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Following failure in Rwanda (1994) and the mas-
sacre in Srebrenica (1995), the former United 
Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan present-
ed the following question:
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Sre-
brenica, to gross and systematic violation of 
human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?” 42
It was clear that Humanitarian Intervention was 
no longer acceptable and shortly after the Inter-
national Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty compiled a report on the Respon-
sibility to Protect in 200143  in response Annan’s 
42. Kofi Annan, Millennium Development Report to the 55th Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly. (5th September, UN DOC DP1/2083/Rev.1). 
43. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001) (ICISS) XI.
44. However, it should be noted here that the concept of sovereignty and responsibility was first coined by 
Deng et al in 1996. See: Francis Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and William Zart-
man, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Brookings Institution Press, 1996).
45. Kofi Annan, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, 59th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (2nd December 2004, UN DOC A/59/565).
46. United Nations General Assembly, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all’ (21 March 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005.
47. ibid.
48. United Nations General Assembly ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/1, para 138 and para 139.
49. Alex J. Bellamy ‘The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2015) <http://www.cries.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/09/006-bellamy.pdf> accessed on 12 March 2019.
50. United Nations Secretary General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ (2009) United Nations 
General Assembly (63rd Session, A/63/677).
51. ibid.
52. ibid.
question. The report was the first of its kind to 
seriously consider sovereignty as a responsibil-
ity.44  Following this, in 2004 the report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Changes45  which promoted R2P as a collective 
responsibility was published, followed by the 
2005 In Larger Freedom report46  which sought to 
“move from an era of legislation to an era of im-
plementation”.47  R2P was finally fully endorsed 
within paragraphs 138-140 of the World Sum-
mit Outcome Document 200548  and was sub-
sequently reaffirmed by United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1674 (2006), 1895 (2006) 
and 2150 (2014).49  In 2009 the Implementing the 
responsibility to protect50  report was published, 
which developed the three pillar strategy of R2P. 
Pillar one focuses on the protection responsibil-
ities of the State, pillar two focuses on interna-
tional assistance and capacity building and pillar 
three focuses on providing a timely and decisive 
response.51  Pillar three is the most contentious 
element of R2P as it permits military intervention 
as a last resort.52  The creation and subsequent 
development of R2P was an international vow to 
never abandon humanity in situations of mass 
atrocity again. 
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R2P provides that should a State be unable or 
unwilling to stop mass atrocity,53  then the in-
ternational community (with authorisation from 
the Security Council) bear a responsibility to 
intervene.54   R2P was designed with a narrow 
scope in that intervention is only permissible 
in response to four specific crimes which are: 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and ethnic cleansing.55  The humanistic side to 
R2P appears to be genuine prima facie,56  how-
ever the intention behind it is host to something 
sinister which threatens to recolonise the Third 
World, particularly with the adaption to the tradi-
tional concept of sovereignty.  
The Westphalian concept of sovereignty is that 
each State possess an inviolable right over their 
internal affairs, which is in accordance with Arti-
cle 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, designed 
to protect the territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of States.57  However, R2P limits 
the concept of absolute sovereignty as it recog-
nises that where mass atrocity situations arise 
intervention may at times be necessary. R2P 
ensures that sovereignty is treated as a respon-
53. United Nations General Assembly ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/1, paras 138 -140.
54. ibid, paras 138-140.
55. United Nations General Assembly ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/1, para 138 and para 139.
56. Translation: based on the first impression (on face value).
57. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 
119. Article 2(4).
58. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001) (ICISS) XI. 13.
59. Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge 
Cavendish, 2007). 183.
60. ibid, 231.
61. Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 117.
62. Edward Newman, ‘R2P: Implications for World Order’ (2013) Global Responsibility to Protect 5, 235-259.
63. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001) (ICISS) XI. 22.
64. ibid, 22.
65. John D. Haskell, ‘TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to Interna-
tional Law’ (2014) 27 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 383.
sibility58  and not an absolute right. The concept 
of sovereignty has become “spatially boundless 
and normatively limitless”59  which invokes sus-
picion for TWAIL, particularly as this attack on 
sovereignty arose shortly after decolonisation 
movements swept the globe.60  Furthermore, 
TWAIL asserts that sovereignty is not in itself an 
equal concept and the Third World experience a 
distinctly different version of sovereignty;61  R2P 
being a prime example as we cannot reasonably 
expect intervention under R2P to be permitted 
in a developed State.62  
Addressing the structural and root causes of 
mass atrocity is also imperative for R2P to be 
successful.63  Root causes include poverty, 
political repression and uneven distribution of 
resources;64  all of which can be attributed to 
the colonial encounter. Yet, consistently where 
mass atrocity situations emerge the criticism is 
with respect to a lack of good governance or 
human rights records;65  further, the emphasis 
on responsibility as Bohm argues allows the in-
ternational community to blame the atrocity al-
most exclusively on the government of the State 
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in which the crisis occurs.66  The impacts of co-
lonialism are not addressed as a root cause, yet 
they should be as the links between colonialism 
and mass atrocity are intertwined, as demon-
strated through the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 
Belgian colonial rule over Rwanda played a sig-
nificant role in fuelling ethnic tensions leading to 
the genocide by placing Tutsi’s in positions of 
power and higher status and limiting the activi-
ties and prospects of the Hutu’s during the co-
lonial era.67   This ethnic tension resulted in the 
genocide with death toll estimates standing at 
around eight hundred thousand.68  The Belgians 
created identification cards for Tutsi’s during the 
colonial encounter and it was these very same 
identification cards which permitted the Hutu’s 
to identify Tutsi targets during the genocide.69 
Therefore, TWAIL is useful in identifying the im-
pacts of colonialism on mass atrocity and as a 
root cause of conflict. The “failure to address 
underlying structural causes associated with 
66. Alexandra Bohm, ‘Responding to Crises: The Problematic Relationship Between Security and Justice in 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 4(3) Global Policy. 1.
67. Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence (1st edn, Simon & 
Schuster 2013). 
68. ibid, 523.
69. Helen M. Hintjens, ‘Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ (1999) 37(2) The Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies. 241-286.
70. Garrett Wallace Brown and Alexandra Bohm, ‘Introducing Jus ante Bellum as a cosmopolitan approach to 
humanitarian intervention’ (2016) 22(4) European Journal of International Relations. 897-919. 902.
71. Graham Melling, ‘Beyond rhetoric? Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect as a norm of humanitarian 
intervention’ (2018) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 5:1, 78-96. 78.
72. The five permanent members being: The United Kingdom, The United States of America, China, Russia 
and France.
73. Simon Adams, ‘Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council’ (March 2015) Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect, Occasional paper Series No. 5 < http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/syriapa-
per_final.pdf > accessed 12 March 2019.
74. Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Events of 2018’ Human Rights Watch (June 29, 2018) < https://www.hrw.
org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria> accessed on 12 March 2019.
75. Yavuz Güçtürk, ‘War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Syria (2015) Insight Turkey, 17(1) 27, 37.
76. ibid 35.
large scale human rights violations is a clear 
weakness of R2P”,70  this includes addressing 
the structural causes which were created and 
are facilitated by colonialism and which are re-
produced in International Law today.
R2P has been controversial since its inception, 
particularly with respect to its “ideational value 
and effectiveness”.71  Criticisms over R2P’s ef-
fectiveness can be attributed to the power to 
veto and hegemonic interests in intervening; this 
will now be explained in the context of Syria and 
Libya. The veto is retained by the permanent 
five members of the Security Council72  and has 
been detrimental to the credibility of R2P; Syria 
being testament to this.73  To date, the conflict 
in Syria has been on-going for eight years and 
has claimed the lives of and caused the disap-
pearances of half a million people.74  War crimes 
have been carried out in Syria, such as the use 
of chemical weapons75  and barrel bombs,76  the 
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targeting of civilians77  and hospitals,78  torture,79 
mass executions80  and sexual slavery.81  Yet, in-
tervention has been ineffective in Syria owing to 
the deadlock caused by Russia and China using 
their veto powers, with Russia casting twelve 
vetoes on Syria to date and China casting six.82 
The lack of Third World voice in decision-mak-
ing or holding veto power also submits to the 
view that it is only hegemonic States that are 
permitted to determine the fate of the interna-
tional arena. 
R2P came under fierce scrutiny following inter-
vention in Libya (2011).83  The Arab Spring was 
a series of anti-government rebellions and pro-
tests across the Middle East and North Africa, 
which erupted in Benghazi (2011).84  Muammar 
al-Qaddafi had ruled Libya since 1969 and when 
the uprisings began Qaddafi vowed to employ 
lethal force on those opposing the government, 
including civilians.85  This quickly escalated into 
a situation of mass atrocity whereby genocid-
al intent became apparent following Qaddafi’s 
vow to “cleanse Libya house by house” of those 
opposing the regime.86  The international com-
munity decided to intervene in Libya and even 
77. ibid 34.
78. ibid 34.
79. ibid 28.
80. ibid 36.
81. ibid 36.
82. Security Council Report, ‘The Security Council Veto’ (February 2019) available at: <https://www.security-
councilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php> accessed on 12 March 2019.
83. Simon Adams, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (October 2012) 3 Global Centre for the Responsi-
bility to Protect Occasional Paper Series No. 3 < http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/libyaandr2poccasion-
alpaper-1.pdf > accessed 12 March 2019.
84. ibid, 5.
85. ibid, 5.
86. ibid, 5.
87. ibid, 7.
88. ibid, 13.
89. ibid, 13.
90. ibid, 12.
91. Simon Adams, ‘Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council’ (March 2015) Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, Occasional paper Series No. 5 < http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/syriapaper_
final.pdf > accessed 12 March 2019.
those sceptical of intervention (including Russia 
and China) decided to abstain rather than veto 
intervention.87  However, the outcome of the in-
tervention in Libya was somewhat catastroph-
ic for the legitimacy of R2P as it led to regime 
change following the toppling of Qaddafi’s gov-
ernment.88  Intent and motivation for regime 
change became more questionable following a 
statement by the United Kingdom, United States 
and France, in which it was stated that:
“it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya 
with Qaddafi in power. It is unthinkable that 
someone who has tried to massacre his own 
people can play a part in their future govern-
ment”. 89  
R2P is purely for the purpose of protecting dur-
ing situations of mass atrocity and not for re-
organising or recreating governments through 
regime change, which was the result of the in-
tervention in Libya.90  The intervention in Libya 
has also facilitated the inaction in Syria as those 
who had abstained in Libya (China and Russia) 
then vetoed in Syria partly for fear of the same 
outcome as Libya91  which is evidenced by Rus-
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sia and China’s veto use increasing considera-
bly since 2011.92   
Despite the flaws with the R2P doctrine, its po-
tential to alleviate suffering from some of the 
gravest human rights violations and protecting 
human life in mass atrocity should not be dis-
regarded. R2P effectiveness is hindered signif-
icantly by the Security Council, which is suc-
cinctly explained by Melling and Dennett:
“The Security Council, therefore, due in large 
part to the veto power, continues to reveal 
itself to be dysfunctional on important mat-
ters and increasingly, states are despairing at 
its lack of response to the gravest of situa-
tions”.93 
Keeping the ideology for promoting respect for 
human life in mass atrocity is fundamental, it is 
the ineffective Security Council role which must 
change. One solution could be to issue R2P 
through regional organisations. This will be con-
sidered in the subsequent subsection.
REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Regional organisations can be defined as:
“a union of States closely linked in territorial 
terms or an international organization based 
upon a collective treaty, whose primary focus 
is the maintenance of international peace and 
security within the framework of the United 
92. Security Council Report, ‘The Security Council Veto’ (February 2019) available at: <https://www.security-
councilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php> accessed on 12 March 2019.
93. Graham Melling and Anne Dennett, ‘The Security Council Veto and Syria: responding to mass atrocities 
through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (2017) 57(3-4) Indian Journal of International Law. 285-307. 287.
94. Kiho Cha, ‘Humanitarian Intervention by Regional organisations Under the Charter of the United Na-
tions’ (2002) 3(2) Seton Hall. J. Dipl. & Int’l Rel. 134, 135.
95. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001) (ICISS) XI. 53.
96. James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention & the Responsibility to Protect (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 238.
97. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 
119. Article 24.
98. ibid, Article 53. 
Nations”.94 
Examples of regional organisations include (but 
are not limited to): The European Union, the Afri-
can Union and the Arab League. Membership is 
usually composed of States within the confines 
of that specific geographical region (but not al-
ways). 
Regional organisations as authorisers and inter-
venors rather than the Security Council could 
be permissible providing that the intervention is 
undertaken within that specific regional organ-
isations defining boundaries.95  This has been 
considered by Pattison who argues that it is 
possible for regional organisations to undertake 
intervention within the parameters of their own 
region and this could done by amending the con-
stitutional arrangements and treaty provisions of 
each specific regional organisation.96  Therefore, 
a legal and legitimate basis for intervention to 
be undertaken by regional organisation may be 
possible.  However, it must be noted that Article 
24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers 
primary responsibility for international peace 
and security onto the Security Council97  and 
Article 53 of the Charter prohibits enforcement 
action from being undertaken without author-
isation from the Security Council.98  Therefore, 
regional intervention without authorisation from 
the Security Council could raise issues of con-
stitutionality as to act otherwise could under-
mine the basic intentions of the Charter.
Conference Paper
With respect to the above, it may be possible 
to circumvent submitting regional intervention 
to the Security Council prior to undertaking the 
intervention. Although Article 53 of the Charter 
would require regional organisations to seek au-
thority from the Security Council, there is noth-
ing in the present Charter which determines that 
this authorisation must be sought prior to inter-
vention.99  Therefore, it may be possible to avoid 
regional intervention being subjected to the veto 
through ex post facto application of Article 53 
of the Charter. Effectively, this would enable re-
gional organisations to intervene and then seek 
authorisation from the Security Council after the 
intervention has occurred meaning that even if 
the Security Council object, the civilian lives in 
mass atrocity have been protected. This would 
not be a direct violation of the Charter as it is 
an interpretation within the given framework, 
and it upholds respect for human rights which 
is a cornerstone principle of the Charter. Indeed, 
seeking authorisation following an intervention 
will inevitably face criticism in that such applica-
tion of Article 53 may prove to be untenable and 
unsustainable.100  Yet, if this is one of the limited 
options available to ensure that regional organ-
isations can intervene without being subjected 
to the veto, then it is a legal avenue which must 
be fully explored. 
Regional organisations are the chosen inter-
venor for their specific TWAIL advantages and 
their more general comparative advantages. 
With respect to specific TWAIL advantages, re-
99. ibid, Article 53.
100. Kiho Cha, ‘Humanitarian Intervention by Regional organisations Under the Charter of the United Na-
tions’ (2002) 3(2) Seton Hall. J. Dipl. & Int’l Rel. 134, 138.
101. United Nations General Assembly- Security Council, ‘The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements 
in implementing the responsibility to protect’ (27 June 2011) UN Doc A/65/877-S/2011/393, 6.
102. David Carment and Martin Fischer, ‘R2P and the Role of Regional organisations in Ethnic Conflict 
Management, Prevention and Resolution: The Unfinished Agenda’ (2009) 1(3) Global Resp. Protect 261, 268.
103. ibid, 268.
104. United Nations General Assembly- Security Council, ‘The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements 
in implementing the responsibility to protect’ (27 June 2011) UN Doc A/65/877-S/2011/393, 6.
105. Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001) OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/23.15, art 4(h).
gional organisations would not be as subjected 
to the interests of far-away hegemonic powers 
residing within the Security Council, if the Secu-
rity Council role is limited. Regional intervention 
also has the potential to include the Third World 
voice and to better address the cultural ties to 
the land through local knowledge and historical 
awareness101  which may assist in identifying 
root causes of conflict. Regional organisations 
are also chosen for their comparative advantag-
es as they are often located within close prox-
imity to conflict and will therefore have a greater 
interest in resolving it promptly.102  Neighbour-
ing States are the most likely to bear the bur-
den of having unwanted armed groups traveling 
through their territory as well as having dispro-
portionate refugee numbers.103  Regional organ-
isations are also usually best situated geograph-
ically, meaning they are likely to detect conflict 
in neighbouring States at its early stages104  and 
can therefore respond quickly. 
If regional organisations are to be tasked with 
undertaking intervention, then they will require 
mechanisms to make this possible. This re-
search will develop these mechanisms at a later 
stage, but they will include financial arrange-
ments, voting structure (with no veto power) and 
identifying the resources required. These mech-
anisms could also assist regional organisations 
which currently have a provision for intervention 
in their constitution such as Article 4(h) of the 
African Union,105  but which are somewhat hin-
dered from maximising its potential. For exam-
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ple, the African Standby Force is to be used in 
situations of mass atrocity, but it is not effective 
enough owing to a severe lack of training and 
funding for military resources.106  A financial ar-
rangement which may assist here is the mem-
orandum of understanding proposed between 
the United Nations and regional organisations 
under which the United Nations highlighted that 
they were willing to amend their peacekeeping 
budget to finance regional organisation opera-
tions.107  Strong mechanisms will assist with ef-
fective regional intervention.
CONCLUSIONS
R2P is a worthy ideology. Even the most critical 
of TWAIL scholars are likely to find moral diffi-
culty in critiquing the value of protecting human 
life during mass atrocity. However, the imperi-
alist structures of R2P (particularly with respect 
to the Security Council veto power) have been 
catastrophic for R2P credibility and evidences 
issues with the Security Council in exercising 
its primary function of maintaining internation-
al peace and security.108  An innovative solution 
is required which would benefit those in mass 
atrocity but specifically Third World States who 
are usually directly affected yet intentionally ex-
cluded from decision-making processes in this 
area. One solution presented here is to encour-
age ex post facto application of Article 53 of the 
Charter of the United Nations to permit regional 
organisations to legitimately intervene within the 
parameters of their own region. The compara-
tive advantages and cultural knowledge regional 
organisations possess may be more beneficial in 
situations of mass atrocity than decisions made 
106. David Carment and Martin Fischer, ‘R2P and the Role of Regional organisations in Ethnic Conflict 
Management, Prevention and Resolution: The Unfinished Agenda’ (2009) 1(3) Global Resp. Protect 261, 276.
107. United Nations General Assembly, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights 
for all’ (26 May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005/ Add.3, 16.
108. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 
119. Article 24.
109. United Nations Press Release, ‘Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again 
to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or Mass Slaughter’ (16th December 1999). SG/
SM/7263/AFR/196. < https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19991216.sgsm7263.doc.html> accessed on 12 
March 2019.
by States sitting around a table in New York. 
This research will later develop the mechanisms 
which would be required to ensure successful 
regional interventions, including but not limited 
to financial arrangements, voting structure and 
identifying the resources required. Ultimately, it 
is concluded that if we do not fix a system which 
has been flawed since its inception yet continue 
to rely on it in times of mass atrocity, then impe-
rialist interests will always be permitted to aban-
don humanity in times of mass atrocity. We must 
fix a system which is broken so that in the fu-
ture there is hopefully some sincerity around the 
meaningless slogan of “never again” 109 which 
has characterised and continues to characterise 
mass atrocity.
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